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law permits a sentence of life in prison even if the Commonwealth has
proven one or both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. A
reasonable juror might conclude, however, that "if you believe from all
the evidence that the death penalty is not justified" 20 means "if the
Commonwealth has failed to prove one or more aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt." In any event, Virginia Code section 19.2-
263.2 provides that courts are not to refuse instructions that are correct
statements of the law simply because they do not conform to model
instructions.
Communication from judge to jury about consideration of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors implicates important Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment issues.2 1 Consequently, instructions such as those
rejected in Joseph should continue to be proffered. In many instances,
they will be given by the trial judge. If denied, claims of error should be
preserved on federal constitutional grounds.
HI. Sentence Review
Joseph utilized a very salutary strategy by claiming that the cumu-
lative effect of the trial court's errors produced a jury recommendation
based upon impermissible factors.22 The trial court and the Supreme
Court of Virginia summarily rejected this contention.
23
There may be great benefit, however, to Joseph's argument of error
based on the entirety of the record. By making a cumulative claim and
20 Id. at 869.
21 Issues raised by the court's denial of proffered defense instruc-
tions suggest a procedural barrier to the jury's consideration of mitiga-
tion evidence. Such barriers are forbidden by McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) (holding that a state cannot have a unanimity
requirement for the jurors consideration of mitigation evidence) and
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (holding that a sentencer
must be able to consider all mitigating evidence).
22 Joseph, 452 S.E.2d at 870.
23 Id.
being rejected, Joseph may have preserved on appeal some issues not
specifically addressed at trial. He has, in any event, added to the list of
claims potentially eligible for federal review. All assignments of error
should be raised broadly and narrowly.
IV. Proportionality
The Supreme Court of Virginia compared the record in this case and
the records in other capital murder cases pursuant to Virginia Code
section 17-110.1(E).24 The court explained that it paid particular
attention to cases in which the underlying felony was robbery and the
death penalty was imposed based on "future dangerousness." 25 The
court also claimed to have reviewed cases where life sentences were
imposed, citing, Whitley v. Commonwealth.26 Whitley, however, was a
case where death was imposed. In all its proportionality review the
Supreme Court of Virginia claims to review life sentence cases reaching
it. Citations to such cases are never included. Appellate counsel might
consider seeking them under Virginia Freedom of Information Act.27
Even if life cases reaching the court are considered, the pool of cases is
inadequate. Many capital cases resulting in life sentences are not ap-
pealed and others do not reach the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Michael H. Spencer
24 Id. at 871. This section requires that the Supreme Court of
Virginia to conduct an analysis to determine whether the death penalty
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
25 Id.
26 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171 (1982), cert. denied. 459
U.S. 882 (1982).
27 See Heavner, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Alternative Methods
of Discovery in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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FACTS
On January 26,1992, a badly decomposed body was found in the
woods behind a shopping center at the intersection of Patterson Avenue
and Pump Road in Henrico County. The body was identified as fifteen-
year-old Anthony Brown. He was determined to have died in November
1991. An autopsy revealed that Brown had sustained injuries to the throat
and wrist, as well as two gunshot wounds to the back of the head. It was
later determined that on November 20, 1991, Brown had travelled from
New York City to Richmond, where he was abducted, robbed and killed
by Kevin Cardwell.t
Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501,506,450 S.E.2d 146,
150 (1994).
2 Id. at 504, 450 S.E.2d at 148-49. The jury fixed Cardwell's
A Circuit Court jury in Henrico County convicted Cardwell of
the capital murder of Anthony Brown in the commission of armed
robbery, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-31(4) and capital
murder in the commission of an abduction with intent to extort money oi
pecuniary benefit, in violation of Code section 18.2-31 (1). The jury alse
found Cardwell guilty of related non-capital felonies and fixed punish-
ment for those offenses.2 In the second phase of the capital trial, the jury
fixed Cardwell's punishment at death for capital murder based upon the
"vileness" predicate under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2. The court,
pursuant to Code section 19.2-264.5, sentenced Cardwell in accord witl
the jury verdicts. 3
punishment at life imprisonment for abduction, twenty years for robber3
and ten years for firearms charges as well as a $100,000 fine for the
abduction.
3 Id.
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HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Cardwell's death sentence
with his appeals of capital murder and other convictions, pursuant to
Code sections 17-110.1 (F) and 17-110.2, the Supreme Court of Virginia




I. Denial of a Continuance
Cardwell contended that the trial court erred in denying his request
for a second continuance. 5 This request was made after the defense
learned that the psychologist appointed to assist Cardwell in the penalty
phase of the trial would not be able to evaluate Cardwell until August 25,
1993. This became problematic since the trial date was scheduled for
September 7, 1993 and the psychological evaluation would take one and
a half months to complete. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however,
held that the granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of
a trial court, and its ruling will not be reversed unless plainly wrong.
6
Unfortunately, this assignment of error was characterized only as a
state law issue. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia had the
final word. In addition to applicable state law grounds, denial of a
continuance could and should be characterized as denying the accused
effective assistance of counsel and compulsory process as well as the
applicable guarantees embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. By following this scheme, the issue will be preserved for
federal review.
11. Irrelevant Penalty Trial Evidence
During the penalty phase of Cardwell's trial, the prosecution
introduced evidence of his past marijuana possession, unemployment
and trespassing.7 Since this evidence did not pertain to Cardwell's
conduct in committing the crime itself, the evidence must have been
directed towards the"future dangerousness" predicate. 8 Therecord does
not show that Cardwell objected to this evidence even though these acts
bear no relation to a propensity to commit serious violent acts in the
future. Thus, this issue was addressed by neither the trial court nor the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
It should be noted that the penalty phase of a capital trial ought not
to be turned into a "free-for-all" of evidence. The Virginia rules of
4 The court rejected some of Cardwell's assignments of error in
brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law. On
still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply
broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. Issues in these categories that will not be addressed in this
analysis include: (1) refusal to require the Commonwealth to elect
between one of the two capital murder charges, (2) refusal to give a
cautionary jury instruction on taking theuncorroborated testimony of the
accomplice, and (3) allegation of trial court error in admitting
unadjudicated criminal conduct in the penalty phase of the trial.
5 Cardwell, 248 Va. at 507,450 S.E.2d at 150.
6 Id. at 508, 450 S.E.2d at 151.
7 Id. at 512,450 S.E.2d at 153.
8 Id.
9 Prosecutorial evidence should only encompass evidence that
makes it more likely that the defendants conduct was vile or that he will
commit violent acts in the future. See generally 1 Charles E. Friend, The
Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 135 (4th ed. 1993).
relevancy still apply to the evidence admitted during the penalty phase
of a capital trial. 9 During this stage of the trial, the prosecution can offer
evidence that tends to show the "vileness" of the defendant's conduct or
the "future dangerousness" of the defendant. 10 It is important that the
defense attorney consistently force the prosecution to meet its burden of
relevancy in order to prevent inflammatory and wholly irrelevant mate-
rial from being admitted. This could take the form of a pretrial motion in
limine that bars evidence that is irrelevant to either "vileness" or "future
dangerousness" predicates. Defense counsel could also object when such
evidence is offered at the penalty phase of the trial.
III. The Theme of Mitigation
The only mitigating evidence offered by Cardwell consisted of the
testimony of his grandmother. 11 This minimal showing in mitigation
may have stemmed from the court's denial of a continuance to permit an
examination by a defense mitigation expert. As aresult of the trial court's
denial, the defense may have had insufficient information from which to
create a theme of mitigation-an example of the prejudice that flowed
from the lack of assistance from the mental health expert.12 Formulating
a theme of mitigation is essential so that all available evidence can be
marshalled around it and presented. Testimony of a single witness, a
grandmother, is plainly inadequate.
This theme is necessary in order to facilitate a jury's understanding
of why the defendant acted in a manner which led to the commission of
a capital crime. Such a theme should be built from the evaluations made
by individual mental health experts as well as other individuals who may
be able to testify as to the defendant's family history, or adjustment to
prison life or to the restrictions that would be placed upon the defendant
if given a life sentence.
13
IV. Penalty Trial Instructions
Cardwell also argued that the trial court erred in refusing his jury
instruction No. A., which would have told the jury that it was "'not
compelled to impose the death penalty even if [the jury] find[s] one or
both of [the aggravating factors] proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'
14
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, held that instruction No. I.,
which was given to the jury, was adequate. It "told the jury that it must
decide whether Cardwell shall be sentenced to death or to imprisonment
for life and that, before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Common-
wealth must prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt either or both
of the aggravating factors, i.e. 'vileness' or 'future dangerousness.""15
Citing Stewart v. Commonwealth,16 the court held that Instruction No. 1.
10 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
11 Id. at 513, 450 S.E.2d at 154.
12 "mhe court shall appoint one or more qualified mental health
experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in the
preparation and presentation of information concerning the defendant's
history, character, or mental condition .... " Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1 (1990). A post-trial motion may be necessary in order to make
a showing of prejudice from the trial court's denial of time or other
resources.
13 These suggestions are not exhaustive. See case summary of
Joseph, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. See also William S. Geimer,
Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 273 (1990-91).
14 Cardwell, 248 Va. at 514,450 S.E.2d at 154.
15 Id.
16 245 Va. 222, 244-45, 427 S.E.2d 394,408-09 (1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 143 (1993).
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"adequately informed the jury that the death penalty was not mandatory
even if both aggravating factors were proven by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt."
17
It seems evident, however, that there is a fundamental difference
between the two instructions. Instruction No. 1 tells the jury not to find
death if the Commonwealth does not prove the aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under such instructions, the jury could
mistakenly infer that once an aggravating factor is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury must find death. At no time does Instruction
No. 1. tell the jury that it can fix punishment at life imprisonment even
if it finds both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction
No. A would have clarified this assertion. 8 Furthermore, Virginia Code
section 19.2-263.2 states that a court is not to refuse a proper instruction
simply because it does not conform to the model instruction.
Cardwell's inability to give instruction No. A. made it virtually
impossible forhim to convey to the jury its right to vote life imprisonment
even if it found either aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. As
a result, the jury may not have been clear on the scope of its power and
may have thought that once it found an aggravating factor, it must vote
for death. This, in effect, would make the introduction of mitigation
evidence useless since the jury believes that it must vote death even if an
aggravating factor was found. Such a result would be contrary to the
United States Supreme Court's rulings on issues concerning the intro-
duction of mitigating evidence and the effect a jury is required or
permitted to give to it.19
17 Cardwell, 248 Va. at 514,450 S.E.2d at 154.
18 See case summary of Joseph, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
19 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (held that a trial court
must provide a means to give effect to mitigating evidence); Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (held that state procedure cannot pre-
clude the use of mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (held that a sentencer is not to be precluded from the consideration
of mitigating factors in considering a sentence of less than death).
20 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994). Cardwell, 248 Va. at 514-15,450 S.E.2d
V. Simmons Issue
Cardwell also asserted that the jury was entitled to be informed of
the law concerning his parole eligibility under Simmons v. South Caro-
lina.20 The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, distinguished this case
by stating that Cardwell's punishment of death was based on the
"vileness" aggravating factor, unlike Simmons' sentence which was
based on the "future dangerousness" aggravating factor.
2 1 Thus, the
court held that Simmons did not apply.
22
The opinion does not state unequivocally that the issue of "future
dangerousness" was before the jury. The admission into evidence of
Cardwell's prior misconduct, however, clearly indicates that it was.
22
Certainly, if "future dangerousness" was before the jury, the applicabil-
ity of Simmons was at issue. If there was error, it is not rendered harmless
by the fact that the jury did not formally find the "future dangerousness"
factor. That is because the ultimate decision of the jury is life in prisor[
or death. Simmons itself illustrates that. "Future dangerousness" was no.
astatutory aggravating factorin South Carolina and thejury did not make
a finding of it. The United States Supreme Court merely found tha:
"future dangerousness" was at issue, as it probably was in Cardwell.
Simmons issues should be raised, even when it is formally deter.
mined before the penalty trial that "future dangerousness" will not be a.
issue. Since the real issue at the penalty phase is choosing either .
sentence of life imprisonment or death, the unresolved Simmons issue,:
of utilizing parole law evidence as mitigation remain important, even ir
"vileness" cases.24
Summary and analysis by
Michael H. Spence
at 154-55. See Pohl & Turner, IfAt First You Don't Succeed: The Rea'
And Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina In Virginia, Capita
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994); case summary of Simmons
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 4 (1994).
21 Id. at 515, 450 S.E.2d at 155. Compare Joseph v. Common
wealth, 452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995).
22 Cardwell, 248 Va. at 515,450 S.E.2d at 155.
23 See supra text accompanying note 10.
24 Pohl & Turner, supra note 23, §§ VII-XI.
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FACTS
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 27,1993, KennethL. Wilson
entered the home of the decedent Jacqueline M. Stephens and her
daughter Altomika. There, he murdered Ms. Stephens and stabbed both
her daughter and Takeshia Banks. 1
A neighbor, having seen Wilson leave the Stephens' home and
drive away in Ms. Stephens car at approximately 6:30 a.m., called the
police. When the police arrived, they found Ms. Stephens tied to the bed
and covered with blood. They observed pubic hairs and a dried white
substance on her body. A medical examiner testified that Ms. Stephens
I Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 98-100,452 S.E.2d 669,
672-73 (1995).
2 Id. at 99-100, 452 S.E.2d at 673.
had at least ten knife wounds. The medical examiner also stated that noni
of Ms. Stephens' injuries would have rendered her unconscious durinj
the attack.
2
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, pursuant to Virginia Cod
sections 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, a jury convicted Wilson of capita
murder in commission of attempted rape, two counts of abduction, on
count of abduction with attempt to defile, two counts of maliciou
wounding, attempted rape, and grand larceny.3 In the second stage of th,
trial, the jury fixed his punishment at death based on both "vileness" an
"future dangerousness".
4
3 Id. at 97,452 S.E.2d at 671-72. The convictions were pursuant t,
Virginia Code §§ 18.2-31(5), -47, -48, -51, -67.5 and -95 respectively
4 Id.
